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FCC Authority To Regulate the Internet:
Creating It and Limiting It
James B. Speta*
Three strains of rhetoric coexist in debates about the appropriate
regulatory institutions for the Internet and Internet services. The first
strain cried that the Internet should never be regulated and, in its
strongest versions, asserted that the Internet cannot be regulated.1 The
second strain responds to one of the implicit assertions in the first-the
assertion that the Internet has successfully grown without regulationto note that much of its growth was possible precisely because
regulation of telephone carriers prevented them from blocking this new
network's expansion. 2 The third, more recent strain, includes arguments
for significant new regulation of emerging Internet services to combat
the market power of providers, guarantee access, or otherwise maintain
the public interest. The specific debates range from the cable open
access debate, 3 to multimedia instant messaging, 4 to interactive

television 5-to name only a few.

* Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. Comments are welcomed to
j-speta@northwestern.edu. Thanks to Philip Weiser, Michael Froomkin, and Joseph Kearney for
comments.
1. E.g., PETER W. HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC AND
LET COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM 4 (1997); Dan L. Burk, Virtual Exit in the Global
Information Economy, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 943, 995 (1998).
2. E.g., Francois Bar et al., Access and Innovation Policy for the Third-GenerationInternet,
24 TELECOMM. POL'Y 489, 492 (2000); Mark Cooper, Open Access to the BroadbandInternet:
Technical and Economic Discriminationin Closed, ProprietaryNetworks, 71 U. COLO. L. REV.
1011, 1020-22 (2000); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, Open Access to Cable Modems, 22
WHITTIER L. REV. 3, 13-15 (2000).
3. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preservingthe
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 930-33 (2001)
(discussing the origin and the consequences of end-to-end design principles); James B. Speta, The
Vertical Dimension of Cable Open Access, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 975 (2000) [hereinafter Speta,
Vertical Dimension].
4. E.g., Philip J. Weiser, Internet Governance, Standard Setting, and Self Regulation, 28 N.
KY. L. REV. 822, 844 (2001) (discussing the debate over instant messaging regulation).
5. E.g., Hernan Galperin & Francois Bar, The Regulation of Interactive Television in the
United States and the European Union, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 61, 63 (2002).
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These rhetorical strains do not map precisely onto the possibilities for
regulatory governance of the Internet, 6 but here there are three dominant
possibilities as well. First, many propose that the Internet should
remain "unregulated," which generally means that no sector-specific
regulation should be developed to address Internet carriers and services.
Rather, Internet markets and market participants would be governed
only by background legal regimes that apply more generally, most
importantly, antitrust.
Second, many propose that the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") should, as it seems to be doing
currently, address Internet competition issues on a case-by-case basis,
regulating when there is a clear case to do so. In this Symposium Issue
of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, Professor Philip Weiser
proposes a common-law system of FCC regulation in which the FCC
asserts its so-called Title I powers under the Communications Act of
19347 to regulate when the case is compelling. 8 The last possibility,
rarely proffered, is the development of a substantial regulatory regime
for the Internet, tracking in part the regulatory structures longapplicable to telephone companies.
I here offer a version of this last structure. In a previous article, I
proposed a common carrier approach to Internet interconnection
regulation. 9 I now more fully operationalize how such a legal regime
would work and explain why I think this regime would be superior to
one that relies solely on common-law processes, be they the courtcentered processes of antitrust or agency-centered processes developed
under Title I of the Communications Act. While I have no brief for
imposing full-blown price, service, and process regulation on Internet
carriers and services, many of the controversies surrounding Internet
competition have in common a dispute over interconnection.10 Indeed,
maintaining the full-network nature of Internet services would be
advanced by an interconnection default rule. I will argue that this
interconnection rule ought to be established by statute, with the FCC
delegated authority to implement it. This regime will be superior both

6. By which I mean the debate over which regulatory institutions should address competition
matters on the Internet, and not more. Therefore, I am not referring to the debates over
governance of the domain-name system or over content regulation on the Internet.
7. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-161 (2000 & West Supp. 2003).
8.

Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 41,

65-84 (2003).
9. James B. Speta, A Common CarrierApproach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. COMM.
L.J. 225 (2002) [hereinafter Speta, Internet Interconnection].

10. See id. at 229-43; Weiser, supra note 8, at 70.
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to relying on antitrust alone and to relying on the FCC's current (vague
and uncertain) Title I authority.
Certainty is one of the most significant benefits of this regime. The
antitrust process and the Title I process could impose interconnection
within the domain of particular cases. But a statutory interconnection
rule is superior for institutional and operational reasons. Unlike courts
operating under antitrust laws, agencies possess the expertise to
supervise the pricing structures that may be necessary to implement
interconnection rules. Moreover, the FCC, unlike a single antitrust
court, may immediately control the national telecommunications
marketplace. But Title I of the current Act provides neither sufficient
agency regulatory authority, nor an adequate imperative for agency
action to assure that Internet interconnection prevails. Title I, in fact,
contains no particular direction to the agency at all. On balance, an
interconnection rule mandated by statute seems a better alternative to a
common-law rule.
Part I of this article suggests some inadequacies of a courtadministered common-law regime-i.e., the inadequacies of relying on
antitrust alone. Interconnection disputes are likely, and their resolution
will require the application of a pricing regime. Even in circumstances
in which courts have entertained antitrust actions, they have long been
wary of attempting to supervise pricing regimes of this sort. In short,
agency expertise is required. Part II details the inadequacies of an
agency-centered, common-law regime-i.e., the inadequacies of a Title
I regime. In particular, a Title I regime rests on shaky legal ground,
both as to the FCC's fundamental authority vel non to regulate the
Internet and as to the likelihood that any particular FCC regulatory
decision would withstand judicial review. Even if the FCC's Title I
authority were clear, that regime does not provide market participants
sufficient notice of the scope of the agency's potentially significant
interventions. Part III describes in more detail the interconnection
regime and the FCC's supervision of such a regime. The conclusion
offers a somewhat more theoretical justification for my proposal on the
grounds that it appropriately balances likely errors and their costs.
I.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF USING AN ANTITRUST REGIME
To REGULATE THE INTERNET

The antitrust regulatory alternative asserts that sector-specific rules
for the Internet are unnecessary and probably harmful, and that the
general regime of antitrust is both sufficient and preferable. Embedded
within the usual argument for antitrust are three subsidiary claims,
although advocates for the antitrust regime need not rely upon all of
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these. The first claim is that the incidence of competition problems is
likely to be low because of the Internet's market structure and the
presence of multiple entities in most Internet markets. The second is
that antitrust can adequately address whatever competition problems do
develop on the Internet.1 1 The third is that the antitrust regime's
benefits, attributable to the absence of a sector-specific regulator,
outweigh any residual competition problems not adequately
addressed. 12
There are reasons to be skeptical of all three claims, the last two in
particular. First, the early history of the Internet, which is of course all
that is available, has already been characterized by a significant number
of interconnection disputes, ranging from the cable modem debate to
instant messaging, backbone peering, and Internet telephony. 13 As the
market matures, increasing numbers of market actors will provide
sufficient interconnection alternatives that any party seeking access will
be able to secure access. Many current interconnection disputes will
disappear or become trivial. 14 Nevertheless, market evolution also
presents the opportunity for new interconnection disputes to arise, such
15
as the nascent controversies over open multimedia wireless platforms

11. HUBER, supra note 1, at 100 ("[A]ntitrust law remains by far the best instrument for
policing economic behavior in the telecosm.").
12. E.g., id. at 89 ("In the telecommunications arena, the single largest impediment to
effective antitrust enforcement has been the FCC itself.").
13. See generally Speta, Internet Interconnection, supra note 9, at 229-43 (describing various
Internet interconnection disputes).
14. I do not have a technological or business-case crystal ball, but many commentators
(including me) have surveyed past and current developments and believe that additional
competition is coming in most communications markets, which would obviate the need for much
regulation. See, e.g., James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of
Open Access Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39, 48-61 (2000) [hereinafter
Speta, Handicappingthe Race] (surveying various broadband technologies and concluding, albeit
prior to the Internet crash, that "a number of technologies will soon compete to provide video,
telephone, and data, including Internet, services"); Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo,
Access to Networks: Economic and ConstitutionalConnections, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885, 97076, 988-93, 1018-21, 1024 (2003) (reviewing markets and stating, "[Siufficient competition in
the provision of network services eventually would suggest regulatory forebearance in setting
access rates and compelling access, with reliance instead on markets both for pricing of network
services and for assuring the provision of access."); see also Inquiry Concerning the Deployment
of Advanced Telecommunications Services to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely
Fashion, and Possible Steps To Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 2844, para. 1 (2002) ("We are also
encouraged by technological and industry trends, which indicate that alternative and developing
technologies will continue to be made available to consumers.").
15. James B. Speta, Maintaining Competition in Information Platforms: Vertical Restrictions
in Emerging Telecommunications Markets, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 185, 188
(2002) [hereinafter Speta, Maintaining Competition].
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or access to interactive television triggers. 16 To some extent, so long as
technological advancement continues, interconnection disputes will
likely remain.
Second, while the cases against the integrated Bell System 17 and the
famous Otter Tail18 case demonstrate that antitrust can address
interconnection disputes, this regulatory alternative suffers several
deficits. Antitrust depends upon case-by-case adjudication and the
development of facts via an adversarial process, 19 creating the
possibility for delay and nonuniformity, both of which interfere with the
development of business models. 20 It is true that the D.C. Circuit has
recently pushed the FCC to adopt substantially nonuniform rules under
the 1996 Telecommunications Act's local competition provisions, 2 1 and
the FCC has seemingly complied. But that decision is based more on an
interpretation of the controlling statute-that Congress required a

16. E.g., Galperin & Bar, supra note 5, at 79 (discussing the role of interfering with interactive
signals as part of anti-competition strategies).
17. Government antitrust litigation against the Bell System eventually resulted in the Consent
Decree that divested the local operating companies (the Bell Operating Companies) from AT&T.
See United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). But, there was substantial private damages
litigation against the Bell System as well, which has sometimes been credited with moving
AT&T to agree to the consent decree. See Mark C. Rosenblum, The Antitrust Rationalefor the
MFJ's Line-of-Business Restrictions and a Policy Proposalfor Removing Them, 25 Sw. U. L.

REV. 605, 614 (1996).
18. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (affirming antitrust injunction
requiring a local electric company to provide distribution of power from a distant producer to
local consumers).
19. Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Deregulation in
Telecommunications and Antitrust, in DEREGULATION

the
OR

United States: Airlines,
44-45
RE-REGULATION

(Giandomenico Majone ed., 1990). Breyer stated:
Antitrust policy is administered primarily by courts, operating through rule and
precedent. Courts find it difficult to reverse direction or to have a change of heart once
a case is decided. Courts also have difficulty investigating underlying circumstancesparticularly changes in circumstances-because they depend upon a record, produced
through an adversarial process, for their information.
Id.
20.

See, e.g., Warren G. Lavey, Making and Keeping Regulatory Promises, 55 FED. COMM.

L.J. 1, 8 (2002) ("[Allthough many U.S. regulators claim to support faster broadband deployment
by carriers, uncertainty about the details of future regulations can cause carriers and their
suppliers to delay investment and service commitments.").
21. United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that the
FCC's uniform rules on leasing networks violated the Telecommunications Act, which required
the FCC to consider the competitive impact of its rules prior to promulgation); see also
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2000) (requiring local exchange carriers to
unbundle their network elements).
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finding of impaired competitor chances before unbundling could be
ordered 22-than upon any balance of the benefits of uniformity.

Moreover, antitrust courts are less vigorous in their embrace of
claims (such as "essential facilities" claims) that would force a company
with natural market power to open its property or business to others.
Although both Otter Tail and the Terminal Railroad2 3 cases stood as
precedents, the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement refused to

24
adopt a finding of antitrust liability on essential facilities grounds.

The principal reason that antitrust courts are wary of essential facilities
cases is that any mandatory interconnection regime, whether adopted by
antitrust or regulation, requires detailed supervision over the pricing that
governs the interconnection. Without price regulation, the essential
facilities owner, even if interconnecting, can use its superior market
power to erect an exclusionary barrier. 25 This barrier, which can take
the form of a price squeeze or other manipulation of new market entry,
can be nearly as effective as a simple denial of access. 26 Yet, "[o]nly
rarely do the antitrust enforcement agencies create the detailed web of
27
affirmative legal obligations that characterizes classical regulation."
As Professor Philip Weiser has pointed out elsewhere, 28 successful
antitrust injunctions requiring access to essential facilities have
depended upon the availability of expert regulators to supervise the
details of the pricing arrangements between the essential facilities

owner and those purchasing access. 29 For example, the injunction in
Terminal Railroad depended

upon

the

Interstate

Commerce

22. United States Telecom Ass'n, 290 F.3d at 425 ("[T]he entire argument about expanding
competition and investment boils down to the Commission's expression of its belief that in this
area more unbundling is better. But Congress did not authorize so open-ended a judgment. It
made 'impairment' the touchstone.").
23. United States v. Terminal R.R., 224 U.S. 383 (1912) (affirming injunction requiring
railroad association to permit the use of a bridge over the Mississippi River by competing railroad
lines).
24. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610-11 & n.44
(1985) (affirming on the basis of a refusal to deal theory, stating, "Given our conclusion that the
evidence amply supports the verdict under the instructions as given by the trial court, we find it
unnecessary to consider the possible relevance of the 'essential facilities' doctrine ....).
25. E.g., JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
97-100 (2000), availableat http://emedia.netlibary.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
26. Id.
27. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 157 (1982).
28. Philip J. Weiser, Goldwasser, the Telecom Act, and Reflections on Antitrust Remedies, 55
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 11-14 (2003); see also Gregory J. Werden, The Law and Economics of the
Essential Facility Doctrine, 32 ST. Louis U. L.J. 433 (1987) (discussing the essential facilities
doctrine and its relation to unilateral refusals to deal).
29. See also James B. Speta, Antitrust and Local Competition Under the Telecommunications
Act, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 99, 134-38 (2003) [hereinafter Speta, Antitrust and Local Competition].
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Commission's ("ICC") administration of railroad rates; 30 in Otter Tail,
the Court looked to the Federal Power Commission to establish and
monitor rates; 3 1 and the FCC supervised access pricing after the AT&T
the Bell companies provide equal access
Consent Decree required that
32
to all long-distance carriers.
Third, antitrust's advantage of regulatory absence depends on the
value that a regulator might supply. Regulation has well-known
advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, regulatory agencies
possess greater specialty expertise and flexibility than the courts. 3 3 On
the other hand, regulation often results in increased operating costs for
regulated businesses and the possibility that agency capture will
preserve monopolies and not destroy them. 34 I myself am generally
skeptical of regulatory solutions unless they are made necessary by a
serious and likely persistent market failure. 35 I have made the case,
which I will develop further below, that the Internet needs a default
interconnection rule. 3 6 As a result, I believe that an expert agency,
whose jurisdiction is firmly and narrowly established by Congress, has
an important role to play in regulating the Internet.

30. United States v. Terminal R.R., 224 U.S. 383, 412 (1912).
31. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 373-74 (1973).
32. See generally United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982),
affd. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). In AT&T's case, the pricing
was less problematic because the decree's business restrictions prevented the Bell Operating
Companies ("BOCs") from providing long distance services. In the Terminal Railroadand Otter
Tail cases, the defendants were required to provide input to their essential facility on a wholesale
basis but were permitted to continue to compete in the relevant retail market. In such a
circumstance, the competitive necessity to monitor the facility owner's pricing is much more
imperative to prevent a price squeeze or other exclusionary pricing behavior. The AT&T consent
decree contained line of business restrictions that were designed to give the BOCs only the
incentive to sell access and to eliminate the BOCs' incentives to discriminate in their own favor.
33. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 19, at 45 ("Courts also have difficulty investigating
underlying circumstances-particularly changed circumstances-because they depend upon a
record, produced through an adversarial process, for their information.").
34. See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine: Applications in
Telecommunications, Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1252

(1999) ("[Rlegulation must accord rights of participation and policy review to anyone
substantially affected by its policies, which invites strategies and tactics that, at best, retard the
competitive process and, with depressing frequency, invite cartelization.").
35. See generally Speta, Handicapping the Race, supra note 14, at 61; Speta, Vertical
Dimension, supra note 3, at 977-78.
36. Speta, Internet Interconnection, supra note 9, at 275-79 (proposing a default
interconnection rule for the Internet).
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II. THE PROBLEMS OF AN FCC TITLE I REGULATORY REGIME

An alternative to antitrust would be a common-law regime of caseby-case legal development by the FCC under its Title I authority, also
known as its ancillary jurisdiction. The FCC's involvement would
address possible objections that an antitrust regime would be too
variable and that antitrust courts lack the expertise to supervise pricing
regimes necessary to resolve interconnection disputes. The Title I
solution, however, suffers three potentially severe problems as well.
First, the FCC's authority under Title I is, at best, uncertain. I believe
it unlikely that the courts would permit the FCC to regulate the Internet
in any significant fashion. Second, even if courts clearly established the
FCC's Title I authority to regulate the Internet, a common-law regime
does not provide the default interconnection rule that I think is
necessary. Similarly, the FCC's proceeding by way of common-law
process subjects it to much more searching judicial review by the courts
of appeals.
For example, the D.C. Circuit especially, but not
exclusively, has proved quite willing to second-guess the agency on
most policy decisions. Third, the lack of precise substantive guidelines
in Title I not only creates more uncertainty about the possibilities of
regulation, but it also raises some of the spectre of agency capture.
A.

The FCC's UncertainTitle IAuthority

In its Cable Modem Services Ruling,37 the FCC took its first big step
to regulate a pure Internet service, and the Commission asserted that it
38
had authority to do so pursuant to Title I of the Communications Act.
The FCC's statutory authority to regulate Internet carriers and services
under this provision is less than well settled, however. The principal
difficulty lies in the FCC's classification of Internet services as
' 39 If
"information services" and not as "telecommunications service[s].

37. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facilities,
Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002) [hereinafter
Cable Modem Services Ruling].
38. See id. paras. 59, 75-76.
39. See id.; see also Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13
F.C.C.R. 11,501, paras. 73-74 (1998) (classifying Internet services as information services rather
than telecommunications services); JASON OXMAN, THE FCC AND THE UNREGULATION OF THE
INTERNET 22 (FCC Office of Plans & Pol'y, Working Paper No. 31, July 1999) (looking to future
pressure for government intervention), available at http://www.fcc.gov/osp/workingp.html (last
visited Oct. 13, 2003); Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communications
Commission's Computer Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 191-92 (2003) (discussing

classification as rooted in the physical network); Jonathan Weinberg, The Internet and
"Telecommunications Services," Universal Service Mechanisms, Access Charges, and Other
Flotsam of the Regulatory System, 16 YALE. J. ON REG. 211, 225-38 (1999) (discussing
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the Internet is not a telecommunications service, i.e., not a common
carrier service, then the FCC cannot rely on its Title II powers to make
legislative rules 40 or to adjudicate disputes. 4 1 The FCC has shown little
desire to describe Internet services as telecommunications 4services,
2
insisting that the information services classification is accurate.

The argument that the FCC can regulate Internet services even if
those services are not Title II common carrier services relies upon the
FCC's general authority arising under Title I of the Communications
Act. Title I created the FCC, described its membership and general
Thus, section 1 of the
operations, and stated its mission.
Communications Act established the FCC "[f]or the purpose of
regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire
and radio," 4 3 and section 2(a) states that "[t]he provisions of this chapter
shall apply to all interstate and foreign communication by wire or
radio. ' '44 Title I does include a general grant of rulemaking authority to

the FCC, stating in section 4(i) that "[t]he Commission may perform
any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders,
not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in the execution
of its functions." 4 5 Professors Thomas Merrill and Kathryn Watts have
recently contended (persuasively in my view) that section 4(i) is not a
grant of legislative authority to the FCC, but rather a grant of
housekeeping authority empowering the agency only to set rules of
internal procedure. 46 The Communication Act's substantive provisions
classification difficulties and suggesting an alternative facilities bandwith approach for universal
service).
40. The principal provision is § 201(b), which the Supreme Court found gave the FCC
authority to make legislative rules as to any matter in Title II. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.,
525 U.S. 366, 377-78 (1999). There is good reason to doubt that this was the best interpretation
of the rulemaking grant contained in this section, see Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue
Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The OriginalConvention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467,
519 n.264 (2002), but it is now settled law.
41. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 207-208 (2000).
42. To be sure, the FCC in the Cable Modem Services Ruling offered the alternative position
that cable modem services were telecommunications services that the FCC would "forbear" from
regulating under its § 160 authority. See Cable Modem Services Ruling, supra note 37, para. 95,
at 4847-48. But this was clearly a fall-back position in case the Commission's classification of
the services as "information services" was reversed. See id. The FCC might in fact have
difficulty supporting its forbearance ruling, because it would have to show that cable modem
services are subject to effective competition, and that would require it to prove that DSL and
cable were effective competitors.
43. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (1934) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000)).
44. § 2(a), 48 Stat. at 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (2000)).
45. § 4(i), 48 Stat. at 1068 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2000)).
46. Merrill & Watts, supra note 40, at 517-19 (commenting on the legislative intent of section
4(i)).
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and the FCC's regulatory authority cover only three specific types of
communications services: (1) interstate common carriers under Title II,
(2) spectrum licensees under Title III, and (3) cable operators under
Title VI. Indeed, each of these Titles provides the FCC a grant of
legislative rulemaking authority. 4 7 If the section 4(i) grant of authority
included legislative rulemaking, then the specific inclusion of these
other substantive grants would be redundant. As the Supreme Court
made clear in United States v. Mead, judicial deference to agency
interpretations does not derive from the agency's expertise over a
particular question, but rather from Congress's grant of power to the
48
agency to make rules that have the force and effect of law.
It is true of course that several court decisions have relied upon Title
I to establish in the FCC an ancillary jurisdiction that seems to permit
the FCC to regulate even those entities that are not the subjects of the
substantive titles of the Communications Act. For example, in United
States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,4 9 the Supreme Court relied upon
these provisions to affirm FCC regulation of cable television,
notwithstanding that it was neither a common carrier nor a broadcast
service. 50 Indeed, the Court specifically rejected the argument that the
FCC had authority over only common carriers and broadcasters, stating:
"We cannot construe the Act so restrictively. Nothing in the language
of § 152(a), in the surrounding language, or in the Act's history or
purposes limits the Commission's authority to those activities and forms
of communication that are specifically described by the Act's other
5
provisions." '
Nevertheless, more recent Supreme Court authority construes the
FCC's Title I authority much more narrowly, certainly overruling the
broadest language of Southwestern Cable. For example, in FCC v.
Midwest Video, the Court struck down a variety of access regulations
the FCC sought to impose on cable companies on the grounds that those
companies were not within the Communication Act's substantive
jurisdiction. 52 While the regulations were perhaps warranted as good
cable policy, they were unrelated to the Communications Act's
substantive provisions. 5 3 The Court established that the exercises of
Title I authority must be for purposes that are "ancillary to," by which it
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2000); 47 U.S.C. § 3090) (2000 & West Supp. 2003).
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221-31 (2001).
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
Id. at 168-74.
Id. at 172.
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 708-09 (1979).

53. Id. at 696-707.
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54
meant "necessary to," the furtherance of its other regulatory authority.
All subsequent affirmances of FCC Title I regulatory authority have
depended upon showing a close relationship between the regulation and

the FCC's authority over common carriers or broadcasters. 55 Even if
they are good law, 56 those decisions require the FCC's regulation
to be
57
titles.
substantive
those
of
goals
the
of
furtherance
in
strictly
Thus, as the FCC acknowledged in the Cable Modem Services
Ruling,5 8 its regulation of Internet carriers or services under Title I

depends upon a finding that the regulation is necessary to protect
common carrier, broadcast, or cable regulation. Such a finding is
difficult to imagine in the Internet, however.
There are two
possibilities: first, that the Internet service presents a unique

competition problem, unknown to traditional telecommunications
markets because the infrastructure or service is new to the Internet, and
second, that the Internet service creates a competition problem due to its
interaction (as a competitor, complement, or otherwise) with traditional
communications services. As examples of the first, in both the cable

54. Id. at 706-09.
55. See, e.g., Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. v. FCC, 309 F.3d 796, 804 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(denying FCC authority under Title I to regulate broadcasting content because such authority is
otherwise not granted in the Communications Act); Rural Tel. Coalition v. FCC, 838 F.2d 1307,
1315 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (affirming Title I authority to create Universal Service Fund to further the
goal of developing common carrier services at an affordable rate); N. Am. Telecomm. Ass'n v.
FCC, 772 F.2d 1282, 1292 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming conditions of common carriers providing
telephone equipment); GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 730-31 (2d Cir. 1973) (finding
that the FCC has the authority to regulate the manner in which common carriers provide data
processing).
56. There is reason to think they may not be. More recent Supreme Court decisions have
focused much more closely on the question of whether an agency has been delegated legislative
authority to act in particular areas with the force of law. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 226-28 (2001) (emphasizing that the first question in determining an agency's
regulatory authority is a delegation from Congress to act with force of law); FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159-60 (2000) (finding that the FDA did not have
jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products because of a lack of explicit delegation of authority from
Congress). See generallyThomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO.
L.J. 833 (2001) (analyzing the Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel
doctrine of court deference to agency statutory interpretations); Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1721 (2002) (arguing
against a constitutional basis for legislative grants of authority to the executive branch or its
agents).
57. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 173-81 (1968) (holding that the
FCC had authority under the Communications Act to forbid cable company importation of distant
broadcast signals because importation would interfere with the structure of broadcast regulation);
Computer & Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 206-20 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(concluding that the FCC had jurisdiction to forbid state regulation of customer premises
equipment in furtherance of its common carrier regulation of telephone companies).
58. See Cable Modem Services Ruling, supra note 37, paras. 78-79.
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modem dispute and the dispute over Internet backbone peering and
transit arrangements, the only carriers and entities with a stake in the
regulation are Internet carriers. But, in these types of cases, the FCC
would not have "ancillary" jurisdiction, because regulating these new
services or infrastructures would not be ancillary to traditional
59
telecommunications, broadcast, or cable services.
The FCC's attempt to claim ancillary authority in the second class of
cases-where the new Internet service competes with a traditional
service-runs square into the central theme of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 ("1996 Act"), which was the introduction of competition
into all telecommunications markets. This presents the most significant
barrier to the use of the agency's Title I authority. Southwestern Cable
permitted the FCC to regulate cable companies in order to protect
broadcasters, and hence broadcast regulation. 6° But the 1996 Act
conclusively states that the FCC should encourage competitive entry in
all telecommunications markets. 6 1 Indeed, the 1996 Act instructs the
FCC to dismantle the Communications Act's regulatory structure when
additional competition proves it unnecessary. 6 2 Under the 1996 Act, a
Title I regulatory theory that depends on an argument that broadband
carriers are providing competition to traditional Title II carriers should
be met with an elimination of regulation, not the creation of an entirely
new, untethered regulatory power for the FCC.
B. Common Law Process Under Title I
Even if the FCC has jurisdiction and substantive authority under Title
I to regulate the Internet, proceeding under those provisions, especially
in a common-law fashion of devising rules on a case-by-case basis,
seems likely to create significant uncertainties. The first uncertainty is
the FCC's ability, in the absence of any statutory confirmation of the
goals it should pursue, to persuade the courts to let its decisions stand.
Although the appellate standard of review is technically limited,6 3 a
59. As to cable modem regulation, one can make an argument about "regulatory symmetry"
between cable companies and the incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs") required to
provide loops on a nondiscriminatory basis to unaffiliated entities. But it is hard to see how
imposing open access requirements on cable companies would be necessary to maintaining the
ILEC regulatory scheme.
60. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 172-73.
61. See 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2000).
62. 47 U.S.C. §§ 160-161 (2000).
63. The courts of appeals should affirm the FCC's decisions if supported by substantial
evidence, based on a permissible interpretation of the Act, and otherwise not arbitrary and
capricious. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2000); see also 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (2000) (applying judicial
review procedures of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2431-51 to FCC orders and decisions); Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
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review of the cases reveals, at a minimum, that the courts have not
always approved of the FCC's implementation of the 1996 Act. The
Supreme Court did uphold the FCC's core decisions to take jurisdiction
over the rules implementing the 1996 Act's local competition provisions

and to adopt forward-looking pricing methodology for unbundled
network elements. 64 However, the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit
struck down many of the FCC's other attempts to implement the 1996
Act as either irrational interpretations or as arbitrary and capricious. 65
In the first agency reversal under the lenient second prong of the
Chevron standard, the Supreme Court refused to uphold the FCC's
interpretation of the central "necessary" and "impair" standards for
66
unbundling network elements.
The D.C. Circuit's decisions in several cases also demonstrate a
willingness to demand substantial theoretical and evidentiary bases for
the FCC's policy decisions and conformity with the economic theories

v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) (discussing court reviews of
agency decisions).
64. See generally Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 476-77 (2002)
(discussing rules for pricing these elements); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 38794 (1999) (discussing the Act's requirements concerning which elements must be leased).
65. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 388-91; Worldcom, Inc. v. FCC, 308 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (reversing in part the FCC's methodology to determine entry by BOC into long-distance
(Massachusetts)); AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 292 F.3d 808, 811-13 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (reversing an
FCC order that inter-exchange carriers must buy switched access from competitive local
exchange carriers); United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 419-30 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(invalidating the FCC's second attempt at global unbundled network elements ("UNE") rules);
Sinclair Broad. Group v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (reversing in part the FCC's
common broadcast ownership rules); Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 104045, 1049-50 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding the FCC's retention of national television station
ownership and cable broadcast cross ownership rules arbitrary and capricious); Worldcom, Inc. v.
FCC, 246 F.3d 690, 692-96 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding that the FCC's rules characterizing DSL
service as an exchange access service were based on inadequate reasoning); AT&T Corp. v. FCC,
236 F.3d 729, 736-37 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding the FCC's methodology to determine market
dominance arbitrary and capricious); Ass'n of Communications Enters. v. FCC, 235 F.3d 662,
668 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding unreasonable the FCC's decision to allow merging entity to satisfy
resale obligations through a separate subsidiary); Iowa v. FCC, 218 F.3d 756, 758-60 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (concluding that the FCC was arbitrary and capricious in its definition of a common carrier
entitled to receive universal service subsidies under the 1996 Act); Bell Atd. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 206
F.3d 1, 4-9 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (remanding for clarification the FCC's reasoning underlying its
reciprocal compensation rules for ISP-bound calls); GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416, 41819 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (vacating in a large part the FCC's physical collocation rules); MCI
Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 143 F.3d 606, 608-09 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curium) (remanding for
further explanation the FCC's rules covering the implementation of payphone provisions of the
1996 Act).
66. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 387-92; see also GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 642-43 (2d ed. 2001) (characterizing the Court's holding as notable for being the first
reversal of agency action under the second prong of Chevron).
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advanced by the judges. 67 While this tendency may or may not be
proper under administrative law theory, it is certainly well-established.
Although one of the aims of the 1996 Act was to eliminate one single
judge's control over the telecommunications industry, 6 8 it is no
exaggeration to say that the FCC is now sharply aware that its policies
69
will receive searching review by the courts.
Moreover, it seems likely that Title I regulation would be subject to
heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court
has clearly rejected the notion that the Internet suffers any scarcity or
other feature that would give government regulation wide berth under a
broadcast model of regulation. 70 Many Internet carriers and service
providers will be able to establish that they engage in at least an
editorial function, if not directly engaging in speech themselves. 7 1 In

this regard, the FCC's long-standing position that Internet services are
information
subject to
information
transmitting
selection, or

services probably ensures that its regulations would be
First Amendment review.
The classification as an
service emphasizes that the providers are not merely
information but are engaged in the transformation,
manipulation of information. 72 Needless to say, heightened

67. In this regard, I am thinking principally of the D.C. Circuit's United States Telecom Ass'n
decision striking down the UNE rules and its Fox Television Stations decision demanding greater
theoretical and evidentiary basis for the national television station ownership rules. In both cases,
the court acknowledged that the agency had provided a theory, but it demanded even more
justification of that theory-signaling its disapproval of it on the merits, albeit in the language of
administrative law. See United States Telecom Ass'n, 290 F.3d at 419-30; Fox Television
Stations, 280 F.3d at 1040-45.
68. That judge was Judge Greene, who supervised the AT&T Consent Decree. For a
description of this as one of the rallying cries behind the 1996 Act, as well as a reassessment of
Judge Greene's performance, see generally Joseph D. Keamey, From the Fall of the Bell System
to the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Regulation of Telecommunications UnderJudge Greene,
50 HASTINGS L.J. 1395 (1999).
69. See, e.g., Chairman Michael Powell, Statement at Public Hearing on Broadcast Ownership
(Feb. 27, 2003) ("Five times in the past two years we have defended our ownership rules in court.
Five times we have lost. To put it in terms that hard core baseball fans can appreciate, 0 for 5
puts
the
Commission
below
even
the
'Mendoza
line."'),
available at
http://www.fcc.gov/headlines.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2003); Chairman Michael Powell,
Statement at Public Hearing on Media Ownership (Jan. 16, 2003) (stating that the FCC needs
evidence "[it] can actually use to defend ownership rules" to the D.C. Circuit), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/headlines.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
70. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868-70 (1997).
71. Cf. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636-41 (1994) (finding that the FCC's
"must-carry" regulation is subject to heightened scrutiny due to the speech and editorial functions
of cable operators). In fact, in Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County,
124 F. Supp. 2d 685 (S.D. Fla. 2000), the district court struck down the county's cable open
access ordinance on First Amendment grounds.
72. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000) (defining information service).
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First Amendment review would make any FCC regulation pursued
73
under Title I even less likely to withstand judicial scrutiny.
Unlike Title II, Title I does not expressly include an interconnection
default rule. 74 Given the rigorous judicial review to which the FCC's
decisions are subject, I believe it unlikely that the FCC could use its
Title I authority to develop an interconnection default rule.
C. Case-by-case and Capture
The lack of a statutory interconnection prescription, or any other
substantive standards, in Title I and the prospect for judicial review are
not dispositive against a Title I regime. The FCC could respond to
particular competitive problems by developing a complete record and
providing a specific remedy that would withstand judicial review. In
other words, the FCC could act very similarly to an antitrust court but
could use its comparative expertise over communications markets and
75
technologies.
Nevertheless, the lack of substantive guidelines in Title I creates
institutional problems apart from the possibility that any FCC decision
will fail judicial review. The FCC's assertion of a common-law power
to regulate the Internet will provide market participants little guidance
as to the scope of that regulatory authority. Indeed, Title I's vague
standards create the possibility that the FCC will apply tests other than
the competition analysis it currently imports from antitrust law. Not
that long ago, notions of "public interest, convenience, and necessity"
treated competition as only one factor in a complex analysis. 76 An
extended rehearsal of such telecommunications law favorites as the

73. Cf. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1323, 1370-72 (1998) (noting the increase in judicial
invalidation of regulation affecting more traditional forms of communication under the First
Amendment).
74. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(a), 251(a) (2000); see also infra Part III.B (discussing a proposal for
an interconnection default rule for Internet carriers).
75. Interestingly, even in this scenario, the FCC may be subject to more stringent appellate
review than would a district court in an antitrust case, but this depends largely upon whether
Justice Scalia succeeds in conflating administrative law's substantial evidence standard with the
clearly erroneous standard applicable in civil litigation, a topic that is not even within the
ancillary jurisdiction of this paper. Compare Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,
492-97 (1951) (finding that a substantial evidence review requires a searching review of the
agency's record and decision), with Allentown Mack Sales & Serv. Corp. v. NLRB, 522 U.S.
359, 367 (1998) (equating substantial evidence standard with jury standard).
76. See, e.g., Haw. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 771, 775-76 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (finding that the
FCC must particularly consider public interest in terms of convenience and necessity).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 35

Hush-A-Phone decision 77 or Execunet 78 is unnecessary to establish that
the Commission has had and continues to have substantial leeway in
suppressing competition as the controlling test.
In fact, the FCC's Carterfone decision 79 came only after the D.C.
Circuit, in Hush-A-Phone and other similar cases, made it clear to the
FCC that it should not tolerate AT&T's anti-interconnection policies
with respect to customer premises equipment ("CPE").80 Even more
importantly, vague statutory standards permit an agency the leeway that

facilitates agency capture or politically expedient decision making.
Neither makes for sound communications policy and the former can
actually entrench monopoly. 8 1 The 1996 Act aimed to eliminate
regulation that created barriers to entry and competition 82 and to
decrease the likelihood that obsolete regulations would stand in the way
of competition. 8 3 Developing a new regime of regulation without
specific statutory direction seems fundamentally inconsistent with the
1996 Act's desire to decrease the role of regulation in the markets.
III. A STATUTORY

INTERCONNECTION RULE

This Article's proposal for a statute giving the FCC regulatory
authority over the Internet is not a proposal for the entire regime
instituted by the 1934 Act, which included a duty to serve the public,
retail price regulation, and nondiscrimination rules all backed up by a

77. Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956). It was actually not
until the later Carterfone proceedings that the FCC implemented this decision in a meaningful
way. See Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, Memorandum and
Order, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (June 26, 1968).
78. MCI Telecomms. Corp., v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (forcing the FCC to
justify maintaining AT&T's long-distance monopoly).
79. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, Decision, 13 F.C.C.2d
420 (Sept. 11, 1968).
80. Hush-A-Phone Corp., 238 F.2d at 268. See generally Ginter Knieps & Pablo T. Spiller,
Regulating by PartialDeregulation: The Case of Telecommunications, 35 ADMIN. L. REV. 391,
404 (1983) (discussing AT&T's pre-1968 policy that forbade the use of CPE not manufactured by
AT&T).
81. See, e.g., FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION
AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 30-32 (1997) (explaining that where statutes give decision makers
leeway, the possibility of capture or political rent seeking are higher).
82. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2000) (preempting any state law or rule that "prohibit[s] or ha[s] the
effect of prohibiting" the entry of any entity into telecommunications markets); see also H.R.
REP. NO. 104-204, at 50 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 13-14 (concluding that state
regulation was protecting incumbents from competition).
83. See 47 U.S.C. § 161 (2000) (requiring a biennial review of FCC regulations to determine
whether competition has made them obsolete).
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tariff-filing requirement. 84 Rather, this Article advances a statutory
default rule that would require Internet carriers to interconnect amongst
themselves and with retail customers. The FCC would have authority to
supervise interconnection arrangements and to entertain complaints
concerning those arrangements, but such authority would be strictly
cabined. Unlike a pure common law regime under Title I, the FCC
would have explicit authority and an explicit but limited set of
regulations it could impose.
A. Justificationfor a Statutory Regime
The justification for a statutory default rule of Internet
interconnection depends upon three assertions that focus on the costs
and benefits of such a rule. First, an interconnection rule has substantial
benefits. The Internet is a network of networks, and its utility largely
depends on the principle of universal interconnectivity. This is true
both as a technical and as an economic matter. 85 The Internet's
technical innovation is its ability to transmit data that emerges from any
application and to permit applications to correspond without any
changes to the transport networks. 86 Because the Internet is essentially a
connectivity good, it exhibits network effects as an economic matter,
87
whereby its utility to consumers grows as connections increase.
Second, a legal rule will be necessary to maintain such
interconnection, at least sometimes. If markets provide interconnection,
the benefits of an interconnection rule are realized without regulation,
and, given that regulation has costs, the legal rule probably could not be
justified.8 8 As noted above, however, the Internet has seen a substantial

84. See 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000) (duty to provide service on request); id. § 201(b) ("just and
reasonable" pricing); id. § 202(a) (nondiscrimination obligations); id. § 203(a) (tariff-filing

requirements).
85. See generally Speta, Internet Interconnection, supra note 9, at 243-51 (discussing the
technical, legal, and economic aspects of the Internet and interconnection).
86. See generally Lemley & Lessig, supra note 3, at 930-33 (discussing the "principle of
nondiscrimination among applications" and how it has facilitated innovation on the Internet).
87. See generally Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 426-29 (1985) (examining a formal model of network
competition); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic
Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 551-61 (1998) (exploring the application and role of network
economic theory on the Internet).
88. See generally Speta, Internet Interconnection, supra note 9, at 268-79 (discussing the
legal, economic, and technical reasons supporting an interconnection rule).
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number of interconnection disputes already, 89 and it is likely that at
90
least some interconnection disputes will continue to develop.
Third, a statutory default rule would provide beneficial notice and
certainty. Industry actors would develop business models on the
presumption that interconnection-but not more-was required. In
those situations in which the FCC acted to maintain interconnection, it
would not bear the burden of proving to the courts of appeals that
interconnection was good economic policy, nor would the private costs
of the default rule seem severe.
It is possible to imagine the
development of a business plan in which an Internet carrier would
provide only selective access to content providers and services. The
interconnection rule advocated here, however, requires interconnection
only if the network describes itself as an "Internet carrier." 9 1 Thus, a
company that believed it had developed a truly innovative network
92
would not be required to interconnect.
B. The Specified Interconnection Rule
Under the statutory interconnection default rule, Internet carriers
would be required to interconnect, directly or indirectly, with other
Internet carriers when the FCC found, by rule or adjudication, that a
carrier's market power threatened competition. An Internet carrier
would include any entity that sold Internet access service at retail or that
sold a transport service to Internet carriers. It would also encompass
Internet services that provide network addressing, either on a de jure
basis, such as allocation of IP numbers, or on a de facto basis, such as
names and presence databases implementing instant messaging or
equivalent services.
Interconnection would require an Internet carrier to transport or
transit IP-compliant traffic on an equal footing with the IP access
service sold to its retail customers. The FCC would be empowered to

89. See Speta, Internet Connection, supra note 9, at 229-42 (describing various Internet
interconnection disputes); see also supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (listing exemplary
Internet interconnection disputes).
90. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (describing nascent Internet interconnection
disputes).
91. See infra Part III.B.I (defining Internet carriers).
92. Additionally, of course, the intellectual property laws might protect an innovative service,
even if offered over the traditional Internet. Cf. F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 444 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing a theory that
intellectual property rights provide rents, and therefore incentives, to creators); Speta,
Maintaining Competition, supra note 15, at 212 (stating that "[i]ntellectual property protections
will also provide some assurance that innovation incentives will be maintained" when a new
service is deployed to an interconnected network).
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order interconnection upon a showing or finding of both a denial of
direct access to an Internet carrier and the unavailability of indirect
interconnection opportunities. In such circumstances, the FCC would
be permitted to set prices governing the interconnection relationship,
but it would not be empowered to require unbundling. This section
explores these proposals in detail.
1. "Internet Carriers" Defined
The definition of Internet carriers is relatively straightforward, and it
93
tracks the definition of a common carrier under Title II of the Act.
Indeed, a substantial argument can be made that many Internet carriers
largely or exclusively engage in the shipment of bits, and on that basis,
engage in telecommunications as common carriers and not information
services. 94 Even apart from that argument, it is certainly possible to
identify those entities that sell Internet access at retail to the public and
those that sell transit to the Internet Service Providers ("ISP") as
"Internet carriers" with a well-defined role. The definition is somewhat
broader, however, to ensure that the interconnection duty also reaches
the addressing services necessary to maintain the Internet as a network.
The FCC and international authorities maintain the telephone
numbering system to prevent duplication and ensure a distribution of
numbers that permits a logical switching protocol.9 5 Allocation of IP
addresses is exactly parallel. 96 Moreover, services such as AOL's
instant messenger depend upon a de facto address allocation and routing

93. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2000) (defining telecommunications services as offerings of
telecommunications for a fee to the public); cf. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 1475,
1480 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (defining common carrier in the same manner as Title II of the
Telecommunications Act as one who "holds himself out to serve indifferently all potential
users"); Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(defining common carrier in the same manner as Title II of the Telecommunications Act, that "to
be a common carrier one must hold oneself out indiscriminiately to the clientele one is suited to
serve").
94.

See Speta, Internet Interconnection, supra note 9, at 269-71

(discussing aspects of

Internet carriers that might justify common carrier status); see also Cable Modem Services
Ruling, supra note 37, para. 95 (inviting commentary on whether cable modem services should
be subject to common carrier regulation).
95.

See generally MARTIN P. CLARK, NETWORKS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS: DESIGN AND
125-30 (2d ed. 1997).
The universal deployment and interconnection of

OPERATION

telecommunication carriers' SS7 signaling systems and databases largely removes the necessity
that telephone numbers be allocated on geographic bases, but a numbering authority still must
ensure non-duplication. See id.
96. Professors Michael Froomkin and Mark Lemley have recently made the parallel argument
that the similar role of ICANN in the domain name system should subject it to antitrust scrutiny.
See generally A. Michael Froomkin & Mark A. Lemley, ICANN and Antitrust, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1.
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system known as a names and presence database. Because the network
effects of such an address system are so large and because the instant
messaging addressing scheme can begin to replace the underlying
network's addressing scheme, an interconnection duty is warranted
97
there as well.
Similar to the definition of a telecommunications carrier, the
definition of an Internet carrier applies only to those entities that sell
Internet access service at retail to the public. As in telecommunications,
one would be an Internet carrier by selling to any segment of the public;
thus, DSL companies, for example, would be Internet carriers even if
they sold service only to businesses or even only to a small business
segment. 9 8 Of course, one could sell a service other than Internet
access, such as raw transport of other sorts (e.g., frame relay) or an
access service that provided only selective content (e.g., CompuServe or
Prodigy before those services provided Internet access), 9 9 and such
services would not be subject to the Internet interconnection duty.
2.

The Interconnection Duty

The interconnection duty itself would require the transport or transit

of IP-compliant traffic from other Internet carriers. Thus, to the extent
that a company provided Internet access or transit to its customers, it
would have to provide access to all of the content available on the

97. See Speta, Internet Interconnection, supra note 9, at 235-38, 273 (discussing instant
messaging and its place in the interconnection debate); see also Weiser, supra note 4, at 844
(discussing the analytic incoherence of the FCC's treatment of instant messaging in the American
Online/Time Warner merger proceedings and suggesting that more regulation may be necessary);
Applicatio.ts for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations
by Time Warner Inc. and America OnLine, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time Warner Inc.,
Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 6547, paras. 176-90 (2001) (imposing
on AOL Time Warner Inc. a duty to provide an open names and presence database when it
upgraded instant messaging to a multimedia, broadband product).
98. Cf. Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs, 525 F.2d at 641 (stating that one need not
serve the entire public to be a common carrier). Moreover, I have not proposed any "duty to
serve," and so defining the relevant public for purposes of defining a common carrier's service
obligation is less relevant here. Cf. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000) (requiring common carriers to
provide service upon request). I do not think a duty to serve is necessary because I do not
propose to control the ability of access providers with monopoly power to price based upon that
monopoly power. See infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text (discussing incentives and
strategies of dominant players, as well as pricing schemes).
99. A possible example of such service would be an Internet access provider that promised to
permit the subscriber to access only certain types of approved content, such as an ISP that
combined the portal services of Kosher.net or an ISP that served only sites that had content
approved for kids. The proposed interconnection duty would not overthrow such services, which
are in fact not selling Internet access.
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Internet. Such a definition might seem circular, 100 or no more than a
"truth in advertising" requirement, but its force comes because customer
10 1
demand will be for Internet access service and not for something less.
The interconnection requirement could be satisfied indirectly, such as

when an entity selling Internet access service is connected to a

10 2
backbone that itself provides access to all other Internet carriers.
The interconnection rule requires neither unbundling nor wholesaling
of service. Thus, an Internet carrier need not provide access to its

physical infrastructure in the manner that incumbent local exchange
carriers must provide unbundled network elements under the 1996
Act. 10 3 An Internet carrier need not provide its service at wholesale to
other, unaffiliated carriers to market at retail; 10 4 an Internet carrier
would maintain its exclusive retail relationship with a customer, subject
to the customer's ability to find another retailer in the market. I have
maintained that such unbundling and wholesaling requirements would

dampen incentives for network innovations too much. 105

A difficult question is the extent to which this rule would constrain an
Internet carrier's ability to engage in various types of differential
pricing. Without pricing freedom, an Internet carrier with retail market
100. However, this definition is no more circular that the historic definition of
telecommunications common carriage, which defines a common carrier as one that offers service
to the public as a whole. See Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs, 525 F.2d at 640 (noting
the circularity of the common carrier definition).
101. See Speta, Handicappingthe Race, supra note 14, at 79-81 (noting that where a good's
value increases as others purchase it, demand for the good increases as others purchase it).
102. See MICHAEL KENDE, THE DIGITAL HANDSHAKE: CONNECTING INTERNET BACKBONES
15-32 (FCC Office of Plans & Pol'y, Working Paper No. 32, Sept. 2000) (discussing
interconnection issues between backbone providers), available at http://www.fcc.gov/osp
workingp.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2003); Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us Once Shame
on You-Fool Us Twice Shame on Us: What We Can Learn from the Privatizations of the
Internet Backbone Network and the Domain Name System, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 89, 143-67 (2001)
(discussing the role of the Internet backbone).
103. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2000) (requiring that incumbent local exchange carriers
provide "unbundled network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine
such elements in order to provide such telecommunications service").
104. Cf Lemley & Lessig, supra note 3, at 966 (noting that the Internet carriers, such as cable
companies, are not "being forced to share their private property").
105. See Speta, Handicapping the Race, supra note 14, at 82-88. I am not (necessarily)
criticizing here the FCC's recent decision to eliminate the so-called line-sharing requirement for
DSL services, and I am certainly not criticizing the UNE approach to incumbent telephone
network unbundling. It seems logical to further intramodal competition by unbundling the
telephone network while encouraging intermodal competition by refusing unbundling rules in
newly deployed technologies. A substantial argument can be made that the former unbundling
does not interfere with innovation incentives and has been made by Professor William P.
Rogerson. See William P. Rogerson, The Regulation of Broadband Telecommunications, the
Principle of Regulating Narrowly Defined Input Bottlenecks, and Incentives for Investment and
Innovation, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119.
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power may have the incentive to block certain services in order to
increase its own profitability. 10 6 On the other hand, pricing freedom
may permit a carrier to engage in price squeezing or other
10 7
anticompetitive behavior.
To make these issues more concrete, consider a cable modem
provider that is concerned that its Internet service may become a
replacement for its traditional video services. If that provider can
charge a premium for access to those Internet services more likely to be
substitutes for traditional video, such as Internet streaming video, it will
be more likely to provide such services. If it cannot charge such a
premium, it may find that it loses money if it makes such services
available to its Internet customers, and it may have an incentive not to
offer them. The cable modem provider might price its Internet access
on the basis of bandwidth used, and nothing in my proposed rule
prevents an Internet carrier from charging by the bit or setting tiers of
service by which heavier users pay more. 10 8 This freedom may suffice,
because newer multimedia services are likely to be more bandwidth
intensive than older services.
Thus, the cable modem provider may wish to charge for Internet
access on the basis of the application (and not just the bandwidth) that
the subscriber uses. Indeed, any provider would like to be able to
engage in value of service pricing, where providers charge users on the
basis of their value for the service, 10 9 and bandwidth charges will not
necessarily mirror that.
Eli Noam suggests that an indirect
interconnection requirement, or as he phrases it, a rule that a carrier
cannot discriminate against its customers' customers, would prevent
carriers from engaging in at least some forms of price discrimination
based on service quality."l 0 The possibility that a network provider
would develop differential charges or access policies for different types
of services challenges the so-called end-to-end principle of the Internet
most directly. Such practices place an access provider in the position of
106. See Speta, Vertical Dimension, supra note 3, at 1000 (noting the importance of pricing
freedom to argue that even monopoly providers of high-speed Internet access will have incentives
to provide open systems).
107. See generally Jacques Crrmer et al., Connectivity in the Commercial Internet, 48 J.
INDUS. ECON. 433 (2000).
108. Cf. Competitive Telecomms. Ass'n v. FCC, 998 F.2d 1058, 1061-63 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(holding that the non-discrimination rule under Title II requires only the selling of the same
service on the same terms).
109. See Eli M. Noam, Beyond Liberalization II: The Impending Doom of Common Carriage,
18 TELECOMM. POL'Y 435, 451 (1994) (noting that "the ability to price discriminate makes it
easier to be profitable").
110. Seeid.at452.
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treating traffic differently based upon the application that the traffic
enabled."' 1 As a result, Professor Timothy Wu has proposed a "network
neutrality" rule that permits bandwidth charging but forbids charging on
the basis of application. 112
And Professor Lawrence Lessig has advanced the proposition that
any carrier offering an IP service must simply transit all IP traffic
equally. 1 13 It is on this dimension that the analogy to common carrier
regulation begins to falter in the converged services environment. In
the case of railroads or telephone service, a company could operate both
as a common carrier for those services it offered generally to the public
and as a private carrier for other services. 1 14 It was easy to identify the
services because they involved different goods or traffic arrangements.
The digital environment, however, allows the introduction of new
services without alteration of the network's service arrangement.
At this stage in the Internet's development, I am unwilling to endorse
a rule that requires carriers to be neutral among the applications carried
over their networks, although I think that such a rule may well prevail in
practice. 115 The interconnection rule proposed here would allow
Internet access providers to offer services other than Internet access. It
would also allow the carriers to offer services, such as direct
connections or local caching, that successful new services may depend
upon and to set different prices for those services than it sets for Internet
access. The carrier would be required to interconnect to any provider of
these services, thus eliminating provider discrimination if not
eliminating price and service discrimination. In this way, the access
provider retains substantial freedom. Such a rule might, in fact, lead to
more openness than the rules proposed by Professors Wu and Lessig,
because, under their rules, carriers may have incentives to provide only
very limited bandwidth to their subscribers. On the other hand, to the
extent the interconnection requirement has residual constraint on an

111. See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 3, at 931 (discussing the Internet's principle of
nondiscrimination among applications).
112. See Timothy Wu, Network Neutrality and Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript on file with author).
113. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 247-48 (2001).
114. Interestingly, this is somewhat similar to Professor Timothy Wu's proposal that a carrier
may "police what it owns" and provide essentially private services on its own network. See Wu,
supra note 112.
115. It may prevail in practice for technical reasons-that the treatment of different traffic on
the basis of application is too difficult or costly to monitor. It may also prevail in practice for
economic reasons-a recognition by carriers that consumer demand will depend on the
continuing innovation in applications.
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Internet carrier's pricing freedom, the result seems justified by the
imperative of maintaining the Internet's network character.
C. The FCC'sAuthority
The statutory interconnection rule would have the great benefit of
setting a default understanding that Internet service must remain
interconnected.
The FCC would have authority to enforce the
requirement and to entertain complaints. Its authority, however, would
be cabined to interconnection among carriers. It would not have
jurisdiction to set retail prices or to order unbundling or wholesaling of
services. The FCC would have the authority to order interconnection,
but its authority to do so, by rule or on complaint, would be cabined to
those situations in which it could establish that the denial of direct
interconnection was not ameliorated by the availability of indirect
interconnection. Its authority would be circumscribed by the limited
scope of the interconnection requirement itself. Perhaps similar to the
forbearance provision in the 1996 Act, 1 16 the statute should specify that
competition in a market is dispositive against an interconnection order.
Despite this limited scope, the interconnection rule would still be
beneficial. In circumstances in which interconnection is denied, the
complaining party would not need to establish that the defendant carrier
had market power or that its interconnection denial failed an antitrust
rule of reason analysis-something likely required even in a Title I
proceeding. The statutory imperative would provide a strong basis for
any FCC order in the courts, and it would also provide a baseline for
industry planning.
IV. CONCLUSION: ERROR RATES AND COSTS

As with so much else in telecommunications regulation, the
desirability of a statutory default rule of interconnection depends on a
balance of the factors as to which good data is difficult to come by, even
after markets have developed. The balance here depends upon the
frequency and costs of interconnection denials, the inability or delay of
alternative legal regimes in addressing such denials, and the costs of
providing for an interconnection rule (which include both regulatory
costs and the costs of imposing legal interconnection requirements
1 17
where such are actually detrimental to competition or innovation).

116. 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2000).
117. Cf ROGER G. NOLL, RESOLVING POLICY CHAOS IN HIGH SPEED INTERNET ACCESS 46
(Stanford Law and Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 239, May 2002) (advocating a balancing test
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Interconnection is important to maintaining the network nature of the
Internet. Interconnection has been a central feature of regulation of
network industries, ranging from railroads to telegraphs to
telecommunications carriers. 118 Additionally, other legal regimes for
imposing interconnection, where legal interconnection rules are
warranted, seem substantially less efficacious. The biggest wildcard is
cabining the agency in a way that does not promote too many regulatory
errors, but I believe that a narrowly drafted regime will do that.

in deciding cable open access
policy), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=311900 (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
118. See Speta, Internet Interconnection, supra note 9, at 251-68 (discussing history of
interconnection requirements in common carrier statutes).

